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"I  have  never  known  much  good 
done by those who affected to trade 




The environment provides a large number of goods and services to economic agents. The 
authorities need to  estimate their  value in  order to  budget  for  the public policies. While  the 
environment has value, it does not have a price. Thereupon, how to justify the public expenditure 
for its management and extensively the funding of public goods? The economic valuation permits 
to compare benefits and costs, which makes it an important decision tool for policy assessment 
and legislation. It meets a double aim: first, to set up a monetary order of magnitude, so that items 
are inducted in the public decision-making in  respect to their fair value or perceived utility; 
second, to take account of the agents’ preferences in regulation (Dragicevic 2009). 
  The experimental private provision and thus valuation of a public good is principally 
conducted in the framework of public goods games. Elseways, contingent valuation is used to 
value non-market resources such as health, safety or the environment. Its techniques measure the 
Hicksian indices, which are the willingness-to-pay (WTP) or the price at which an individual is 
ready  to  buy  a  commodity  and  the  willingness-to-accept  (WTA)  or  the  price  at  which  an 
individual is ready to sell the same commodity. By using contingent valuation techniques, our 
motivation is to study how subjects reveal preferences over public goods in market mechanisms 
such as the auction processes. This research object comes from the fact that public goods are 
neither traded on markets nor have a market price. In case subjects do want to trade public goods 
on markets, which fair value will they reveal given the negligible private utility derived from 
their consumption? Microeconomic theory stipulates that in case of informational efficiency and 
rational preferences, fair value and market price are equal. Market price should then reflect the 
public  good’s  value.  However,  estimating  the  market  value  from  a  non-market  fair  value  is 
laborious, for subjects reveal behavioral biases during their valuation. Put differently, subjects 
tend to act irrationally. Market price is then irreflective of the subject’s fair value. 
  Economists bind value to utility or preference satisfaction. The amount an agent is willing 
to spend on a good to satisfy her preferences reflects her value of the good. This demarche 
enables  to  apply  the  principles  of  welfare  economics  from  whence  comes  the  benefit-cost   3 
analysis. Economists then calculate the rate at which the agent is willing to substitute a good for 
another. This substitution rate can be captured by means of stated preferences (Bateman et al. 
2002). The weakness  of stated preferences  comes  from  the fact  that they  contain behavioral 
biases. Indeed, the absence of market incentives in form of budget constraints and substitutes’ 
layoff produces disputable data. Agents do not have the incentives to mobilize adequate cognitive 
efforts when they formulate their declarations. Yet, economists need to reveal truthful values in 
order to conduct benefit-cost analyses and estimate the effects of a public policy (Boardman et al. 
2005). Why not measure these values by the auction mechanisms thence? Indeed, preferences 
revealed  from  experimental  auctions  have  been  studies  for  some  time  now:  Bohm  (1972), 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987), Hoffman et al. (1993), Shogren et al. (1994), Shogren et al. 
(2001), Rozan et al. (2004), Lusk et al. (2007). 
  The rationale is that economic value comes from exchange and experimental auctions put 
the agents in the context of exchange. Auction mechanisms are capable of both palliating the 
weakness of stated preferences and creating an exchange. Their incentive-compatibility induces a 
disincentive cost to deviate from truthful preferences. The match of demand (WTP) and supply 
(WTA) then uncovers the market price which represents the economic value. Since the market 
price is a reflection of demand and supply, any 
WTA
WTP  disparity from the public good  valuation 
produces an economic value irrelevant for decision-making. 
  Another issue surrounding public goods relates to  the property rights. To own a public 
good, agents have to buy it. Conversely, they have to own the public good before they sell it. The 
WTA
WTP  ratio comes into play while assigning the property rights, since the difference between WTP 
and WTA becomes the one of valuing property rights. As a result, any disparity measures the 
consequence of assigning a property right  on public goods one way or the other (Horowitz and 
McConnell 2002). Property rights remain difficult to establish or legitimate in public policies, 
whereas in a market the price signals the value of resources on which to base the public decisions 
(Sinclair-Desgagné 2005). 
  Neoclassical theory postulates that with null income effect and close substitutes, WTP and 
WTA are equal (Randall and Stoll 1980, Hanemann 1991),  i.e. 
WTA
WTP 1  , which is in accordance 
with Coase (1960). If a good is available at market price on an active market, WTP and WTA 
should be similar. Yet, experimental research has found disparities, i.e. 
WTA
WTP 1  . The endowment   4 
effect, or loss aversion, as a behavioral feature is often invoked to explain the disparity. It occurs 
when people offer to sell a commonly available good in their possession at a substantially higher 
rate than they would pay for the identical good not in their possession. The other effect, promoted 
to  explain  the  disparity,  is  imperfect  substitutability  between  the  goods.  Two  remedies  help 
remove the initial disparity. The first corresponds to market settings. Market institutions serve as 
social  tools  that  induce  and  reinforce  individual  rationality  (Smith  1991).  Gode  and  Sunder 
(1993) assert that an auction market exerts a powerful constraining force on individual behavior. 
Cherry  et  al.  (2003)  suggest  that  a  dynamic  market  environment  with  repeated  exposure  to 
discipline is necessary to achieve rationality. When they act rationally, individuals refine their 
statements of value. List (2003a) provides evidence consistent with the notion that experience in 
bidding with an incentive-compatible auction can remove the 
WTA
WTP  disparity. The second remedy 
corresponds to market repetition. The motive for repeating auctions that are incentive-compatible 
is that individuals require experience to understand that sincere bidding is the dominant strategy 
(Coppinger et al. 1980) and to realize their true valuation of unfamiliar products (Shogren et al. 
2000). When agents perfectly know their valuations, they submit bids close to their valuations 
(Kagel et al. 1987, McCabe et al. 1990). Even though subjects may not instantly understand that 
sincere valuing is rational, we choose to focus on repetition from the behavioral standpoint
1. 
  Indeed, Plott (1996) advances a discovered preference hypothesis argument, positing that 
responses reflect a type of internal search process in which subjects use practice rounds to 
discover their preferences. The experience they gain is reflected in their bidding behavior. Hence, 
the imperfect substitutability effect disappears when the value of the unfamiliar good is perfectly 
revealed. We believe that subjects experience the sentiment of ownership after each round.  It 
enables them to better stand the preference satisfaction and thus to  divulge their values of the 
good. The iterated adjustments of randomly allotted buyers and sellers reveal their true values, 
means of which converge to a single market value. As Horowitz and McConnell (2002) point out, 
if the ratio were to fall with practice, the   implications in environmental and public policy 
decisions would be important, because  familiarity and practice and thus rationality are likely 
absent. Thereby, is there an auction mechanism capable of reducing the initial gap between WTP 
and WTA and hence revealing the economic value of public good? 
                                                 
1 Besides, we suggested to the subjects that truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy at the beginning of each 
experiment.    5 
  Kahneman  et  al.  (1990)  report  experimental  evidence  of  the  endowment  effect.  They 
perform a hypothetical telephone inquiry, trading environmental improvements and preparedness 
for  disasters.  To  elicit  value  estimates,  they  use  the  Becker–DeGroot–Marschak  (BDM) 
mechanism and find that randomly assigned owners of an item require more money to separate 
from their possession than random buyers are willing to pay to acquire it. According to their 
results, preferences are dependent on endowments, even in market settings. Shogren et al. (1994) 
assert that the experiment conducted by Kahneman et al. creates artificial scarcity. They find no 
evidence of the endowment effect on trading candy bars, for the values converge over time. But, 
in the contaminated food experiment – a good with imperfect substitutes that can be considered 
as non-marketed – they show that the discrepancy remains significant after iteration. While the 
authors support the idea of a low substitution elasticity of the non-market good, they do not 
advocate the institution capable of valuing non-market goods. Later on, Shogren et al. (2001) test 
the BDM mechanism, the Vickrey’s (1961) second price auction (SPA) and the random nth-price 
auction (NPA) to exchange candy bars and mugs, and suggest that the type of auction mechanism 
accounts for contrasting observations in experiments. They show that the early disparity is not to 
be called into question. However, the gap ebbs away under SPA and NPA while it lasts under 
BDM. Therefore, Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) claim that results differ from unsound experimental 
procedures  is  incomplete.  Only  List (2003b)  gives  credit to  the use of the random  nth-price 
auction in valuing non-market private goods, but he does not state whether his results carry over 
to public goods. 
Horowitz (2006a) states that the BDM framework could be used to assess public WTP for 
public projects, with the distribution of costs equal to the project costs; and that other valuation 
mechanisms  should  be  used  if  the  behavioral  evidence  shows  that  outcomes  are  equivalent 
whatever the mechanism. Lusk and Rousu (2006) suggest that NPA is preferable to BDM if the 
researcher is looking for true valuation above all. Lusk et al. (2007) conclude that both provide 
relatively strong incentives for truthful bidding for all individuals.  
We aim at studying market valuation of a public good without direct substitutes, so we put 
the carbon offset, which can be attained via tree planting, into auctioning. Public goods have two 
defining  characteristics:  non-excludability  and  non-rivalry.  Offsetting  carbon  emissions  helps 
prevent the effects of climate change; it is considered a public good because, once provided,   6 
everyone can enjoy the benefits without adversely affecting anyone else’s ability to do the same
2. 
Rather than compulsory carbon trade, we institute voluntary trade to approach truthful valuation 
on both the bidder’s (buyer’s) and the offerer’s (seller’s) sides. On account of the common bias of 
nescience
3 in valuing unfamiliar or public goods, we remind the subjects that they are part of the 
socio-economic setting. This makes them indirectly and partly accountable for the current level 
of greenhouse gases, as they solicit industries to produce goods they are willing to consume at an 
environmental cost. We are interested in paper and energy consumed by students to achieve their 
education
4. Our experiments differ from the early auction mechanisms for discrete public goods 
based on the Lindahl equilibrium by Smith (1979), which require that subjects unanimously agree 
to the public good quantity and cost shares according to their marginal benefits, otherwise no 
public good is provided. 
Our results show that the initial disparity can be removed by means of repetitive auction 
mechanisms, i.e. 
WTA
WTP 1  . Nevertheless, we obtain different results from Shogren et al. (2001). 
The only mechanism able to remove the gap between bids and offers and to fully reveal the 
public good market value is BDM. SPA and NPA do not succeed in eliminating the disparity. 
Still, when we conduct an exponential regression, we find that NPA yields the highest speed of 
convergence towards equality of welfare indices, suggesting that it contains strong incentives for 
rational behavior and market valuation. As a final point, we observe that subjects are strongly 
motivated by the subjective private benefit from funding the public good (either due to warm-
glow
5 or to the concern for being formally identified as a contributor of the public good). 
The remainder of this  paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental 
design. Section 3 presents results and the analysis of data with standard and novel statistical tools. 
Section 4 discusses the differences between auction mechanisms and their relations with existing 
work, and presents a new line of reasoning. We clarify the difference between public and private 
motivations for the public good funding in Section 5 and conclude with Section 6. 
                                                 
2 We ensured the public good characteristic by providing an email feedback on the aggregate offset achievement to 
every subject after a few weeks. 
3 It reflects the absence of knowledge or the consideration that things are unknowable.  
4  The money released from trading (buying and non -selling) was sent to a non -governmental organization that 
launched a plantation of 1,404 Mangrove trees in Sumatra, Indonesia. 
5 Utility derived from warm-glow (see Andreoni 1990) arises when the act of giving generates utility. It contrasts 
with the usual case in public economics where the individual only cares about the total amount of public good.   7 
 
2. The experimental framework 
 
We want to evaluate the impact of three incentive-compatible auction mechanisms in the 
measurement of WTP and WTA for a public good without close substitutes. Our experiments 
were conducted during three sessions at the École Polytechnique ParisTech. Different subjects 
took part in each of the three sessions (three auction mechanisms). A total of 102 participants 
were  divided  in  three  groups  of  subjects,  which  in  turn  were  arbitrarily  divided  into  two 
subgroups of buyers and sellers. Each subject received an identification number she filled in on 
each  bid  or  offer,  enabling  her  to  be  tracked  whilst  preserving  her  anonymity.  The  initial 
endowment distributed to the buyers was put forward to fund tree planting. Each buyer received 
EUR 15 and was asked to state her bid for a certificate of one ton of carbon offset (≤ EUR 15). If 
she won the bid, trees were planted in her name (this was acknowledged by a certificate which 
was publicly given to the buyer). Each seller was given a certificate of one ton of carbon offset 
she could either keep, in which case trees were planted in her name, or sell. If she decided to sell 
the certificate on the offer she stated (≤ EUR 15), no trees were planted. Subjects ignored that the 




Market environment  BDM  SPA  NPA 
Auctioned goods  CO2 offset certificate  CO2 offset certificate  CO2 offset certificate 
Initial endowment  EUR 15  EUR 15  EUR 15 
Sellers’ bound  EUR 15  EUR 15  EUR 15 
Number of trials  10  10  10 
Retail price information  Not provided  Not provided  Not provided 
Optimal responses explained  Suggested  Suggested  Suggested 
Practice round performed  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
Subject participation  Voluntary  Voluntary  Voluntary 
Number of subjects  37  34  31 
 
                                                 
6 In accordance with the system of reference applied by the non-governmental organization.   8 
  The parameters of the experiments are the following:  (i) 31 to 37 subjects participated per 
experiment;  (ii)  subjects  were  recruited  among  volunteering  students  from  the  École 
Polytechnique ParisTech
7; (iii) the good put up for auctioning was a certificate of one ton of 
carbon offset; (iv) no information  on the market-price of the  good  was  provided; (v)  buyers 
received an initial balance of EUR 15 and sellers a certificate of one ton of carbon offset as an 
endowment;  (vi)  in  each  trial,  even  though  the  seller’s  and  the  buyer’s  market  sides  were 
independent, bidders and offerers operated simultaneously; (vii) ten trials per experiment were 
unfolded, one of which was randomly selected as the binding trial; and (viii) BDM, SPA and 
NPA auction mechanisms were tested. 
Our goal is to question the auction mechanisms’ influence on the 
WTA
WTP  gap, and not to 
divulge the gap itself, for we consider it as an established fact. Thus, we decided to put an upper-
bound on the sellers’ choices in order to monitor which of the three market settings best responds 
to the early disparity. The bounds and endowments definitely create an anchoring effect, but there 
is  no  reason  that  it  affects  the  three  incentive-compatible  mechanisms  differently.  Then,  we 
publicly suggested to the subjects that revealing truthful preferences is a dominant strategy and 
that they cannot increase their utility payoff following a different strategy. At last, we pooled all 
performed rounds in the measurement of the gap. 
 
The Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism 
 
Becker et al. (1964) introduce a mechanism under which buyers (sellers) simultaneously 
state the highest (lowest) amount they are willing to pay (accept) for the good. In our experiment, 
each buyer and seller was asked to give, for each of the ten trials, independently and privately, 
her WTP or WTA by marking an "x" on a recording sheet that listed price intervals, such as in 
the following table. The price intervals ranged from EUR 1–15, in increments of EUR 0.5. After 
collecting recording sheets from buyers and sellers, the monitor randomly selected one price from 
the list. If a buyer was willing to pay at least the random price for the certificate of one ton of 
carbon offset, she bought the item at that price. Otherwise, she did not buy the item. If a seller 
                                                 
7 Multi-cultural elite students in science and engineering, considered in France as highly rational. They are salaried 
by the French Government. Their curriculum includes courses in economics.   9 
was willing to accept a price lower than or equal to the random price for the certificate of one ton 
of carbon offset, she sold the item at that price. Otherwise, she did not sell the item.  
 
  I will buy (sell)  I will not buy (sell) 
If the price is EUR 0.0  –  – 
If the price is EUR 0.5  –  – 
If the price is EUR 1.0  –  – 
If the price is EUR 1.5  –  – 
…  …  … 
If the price is EUR 14.0  –  – 
If the price is EUR 14.5  –  – 
If the price is EUR 15.0  –  – 
 
The random price, all bids and offers, and the number of buyers and sellers willing to buy and 
sell at the random price were made public after each trial. At the end of the experiment, one of 
the trials was randomly selected as the binding trial for the take-home pay.  
 
The second-price auction mechanism 
 
Buyers were asked to record, for each of the ten trials, privately and independently, the 
price they were willing to pay for the certificate of one ton of carbon offset. In this case, buyers 
wrote simultaneously a numerical value on the recording sheet. The monitor collected values and, 
after each trial, made all bids public, as well as the identification number of the highest bidder, 
and the market-clearing price: the second highest bid. For each trial, sellers wrote simultaneously 
a selling price for the certificate. After each trial, the monitor publicly diffused all offers, the 
identification number of the lowest offerer and the market-clearing price, the second lowest offer. 
As with BDM, after the tenth trial, the monitor randomly selected one of the trials as the binding 
trial for the take-home pay for both buyers and sellers. 
 
The random nth-price auction mechanism 
 
The  random  nth-price  auction  is  conducted  as  follows:  (i)  for  each  trial,  each  bidder 
submits a bid or an offer on a recording sheet; (ii) all bids are ranked from lowest to highest, all 
offers are ranked from highest to lowest; (iii) the monitor selects a random number  (2, ] nN   
with N the number of bidders; (iv) the  1 n  buyers who made the highest bids buy the certificate 
of one ton of carbon offset at the nth-price and the  1 n  sellers who made the lowest offers sell   10 
the certificate of one ton of carbon offset at the nth-price. The value of n, all bids and offers, the 
buying and selling price, and the number of buyers and sellers willing to buy and sell at the 
random price, are made public after each trial. Once again, after the tenth trial, the monitor 
randomly selects one of the trials as the binding trial for the take-home pay for both buyers and 
sellers. 
 
  BDM, SPA and NPA are incentive-compatible. It is not in a buyer’s interest to understate 
her WTP; if the random buying price falls between the stated WTP and the true WTP, the buyer 
foregoes a beneficial trade. It is neither in a buyer’s interest to overstate her true WTP; if the 
random buying price is greater than the true value but less than the stated value, the buyer is 
required to buy the good at a price greater than her true WTP. The reasoning is identical for the 
seller. A complementary remark on NPA can be made. Contrary to SPA, subjects perceive that 
they still have a non negligible probability to win the auction, even after having observed that 
they are not making one of the most attractive bids or offers. Because of the randomness of n, 
off-margin bidders can be among the winners in NPA while they would be excluded from the 
active part of the market in SPA. As well, the endogenously determined market-clearing price 
(dependent on n) prevents bidders and offerers from using the random market-clearing price as an 
indicator. 
 
3. Results and statistical analysis 
 
  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the experimental results in BDM, SPA and 
NPA.  
{Table 1 about here} 
 
  In  all  experiments,  the  bidding  behavior  in  the  initial  trial  does  not  contradict  the 
endowment  effect:  WTA 
8  is significantly greater than  WTP 
9. Still,  in  BDM,  WTA   
decreases and  WTP   increases
10 with subjects’ experience gained through repetitive auctioning. 
                                                 
8 The pointing angle brackets signify mean value. 
9 This is also confirmed by the analysis of the medians. 





  ratios thus decline throughout the ten trials falling from 1.70 in trial 1 to 0.94 in trial 
10 (Fig. 1), which corresponds to  a  WTP   increase of 39% and a  WTA   decrease of 23%. 
Concerning variances, we notice that the dispersion around the mean increases for both WTP 
(42%) and WTA (245%) from trial 1 to trial 10. In trials 4–10, a t-test shows that we cannot 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  WTP    and  WTA    come  from  the  same  distribution  at  the 
<0.05 p  level. In BDM, the disparity fades away. 
 
{Fig. 1 about here} 
 
In NPA and SPA, the mean selling price exceeds the mean buying price for all ten trials. 
This also holds for the median bids. We observe similar starting and ending values of the welfare 




  ratios remain above one, ranging from 1.35 to 
2.71 in NPA, and from 1.28 to 3.07 in SPA (Fig. 1). Bids respectively increase by 69% and 90%; 
offers decrease by 13% in both experiments. The dispersion around  WTP   follows a different 
path in NPA and SPA. The dispersion around  WTA   amplifies in both auction mechanisms 
from trial 1 to trial 10 (NPA: 103%; SPA: 86%). On the contrary, the dispersion around  WTP   
remains quasi-stationary in SPA (4%) but decreases in NPA (–21%), which suggests a degree of 
homogenization between the bids. In all trials, we reject the null hypothesis that  WTP   and  
WTA   are equal at the 5% level of a t-test. However, we point out that ratios decrease over 
time, approaching the indices’ equality in latter trials. Further, the hypothesis of the equality of 
means between SPA and NPA is verified in all ten rounds, given the p-value. These results are 
unsurprising in consideration of the likeness of the two auction mechanisms. 
Let  us  now take a  closer look  at  our results  and those of the mug experiments  from 
Shogren et al. (2001). At first sight, we obtain contradictory results. In our experiment, the gap 
disappears in BDM, whereas in theirs, BDM is the only mechanism unable to remove the early 
gap. Our findings show that repetitions  in the BDM mechanism can remove the endowment 
effect, as long as it steers subjects’ behavior. Likewise, they suggest that the auction mechanism 
per  se  can  account  for  the conflicting observations,  as  we clearly observe different  paths  of   12 
equalization of  WTP   and  WTA  . We  introduce  a  new tool  to  study  the path  of the gap 




  ratios.  
 
{Fig. 2 about here} 
 
An exponential regression is of a form 
ax y be   with  x  the variable along the x-axis,  y  




 , a the amplitude of the decrease (speed of convergence to equality) 
and b  the y-intercept of regression. The function is based on a linear regression, with the y-axis 
logarithmically scaled. R-square gives information on the extent of the exponential relationship 
between  ratios.  We  apply  this  method  both  to  the  mug  (Fig.  2)  and  certificate  (Fig.  3) 
experiments. 
 
{Fig. 3 about here} 
 
The exponential regression is used for two reasons: first, it allows observing phenomena 
with rapid variations which we observe in both experimental series; second, it allows observing 
the decreasing ratio up to equality. We try to reveal the mechanism that is the source of a quick 
decrease,  independently  of  the  initial  ratio.  We  can  thus  consider  the  fastest  decreasing 
coefficient as the highest speed of convergence to the equality of welfare indices (Table 2). 
 
{Table 2 about here} 
 
Our  data  from  BDM  provide  an  exponentially  decreasing  relationship  between  the 
sequential ratios, whereas the data used by Shogren et al. (2001) do not. Although the y-intercept 
of the regression starts with the same value (both  1.5 a  ), the gap disappears in our experiment 
(the speed of convergence amounts to  0.04 a  ) but stays stationary in the mug experiment (no 
acceleration to convergence). 
We find in both experiments that NPA provides the best exponential relationship between 
ratios  (
2 0.95 R  ;
2 0.96 R  )  and  the  highest  speed  of  convergence ( 0.08 a  ;  0.12 a  ) 
towards  equality  in  time.  In  SPA,  the  exponential  relationship  between  ratios  (
2 0.61 R  ;  13 
2 0.63 R  )  and  the  speed  of  convergence  to  equality  of  indices  ( 0.06 a  ;  0.09 a  )  are 
significant but lower. 




  ratio in SPA – believed to be due to off-margin 
bidders – explain the differences in 
2 R  in comparison with NPA. It is also worthwhile noticing 
that SPA comes out as the "worst" active market mechanism even though it is frequently used in 
experiments to reveal agents’ preferences. In BDM, our experiment and the mug experiment both 
obtain the lowest results in terms of exponential relationship
11 and speed of convergence towards 
equality. Therefore, the orderings of convergence rates in our experiments and those of Shogren 
et al. (2001) are alike. 
  We then study the convergent sequence of fitted values to test the consistency of our 
previous results. A sequence converges at rate    with order q such that 
1 |( WTA / WTP 1|




   
      
(Table 3). The parameter q represents the acceleration rate, that is, the impulse to the welfare 
indices’ equality. Provided that our time length is short (t ), q embodies the true convergence 
speed  and  thus  the  robustness  control  parameter.  By  rewriting   ,  we  can  bring  out  the 
acceleration rate in form of 
1 ln(|( WTA / WTP 1|)
ln( |( WTA / WTP 1|)
t
t q 
   
    . 
 
{Table 3 about here} 
 
  The rates of convergence, seen from the perspective of a sequence approaching its limit, 
are in the same order of magnitudes as those previously obtained (NPA > SPA > BDM). The only 
difference hails from the mug experiments where the acceleration rate is marginally higher in 
SPA ( 1.31 q  ) than NPA ( 1.28 q  ). Both the convergence and acceleration rates confirm that 
our comparative rates are robust. 
 
4. Discussion on the differences between mechanisms 
 
Our experimental results enable us to derive recommendations regarding the choice of the 
auction mechanism in the context of public good funding. If the initial gap between WTP and 
                                                 
11 The low exponential factor with the BDM is partially explained by the initial smaller difference between WTP and 
WTA.   14 
WTA is due to the choice of the market mechanism, then the choice of BDM is appropriate, for it 
produces the smallest initial gap. However, if the auction mechanism is needed to rapidly deflate 




  gap in a market setting, we suggest the use of NPA. 
Now, the differences observed between auction mechanisms require further attention. Let 
us consider two  possible explanations for  our results: disappointment aversion and affiliation. 
Horowitz (2006b) relates that in BDM a bidder may report a higher value than the true one, 
simply because she is more disappointed from not receiving the good than from receiving it at a 
higher price, which induces her to increase the chance of winning the auction and to report an 
overpriced bid. This argument could explain the high  WTP   observed in BDM. However, it also 
applies  to  SPA  and NPA, so  disappointment  aversion  cannot explain  the  difference  between 
BDM and SPA/NPA. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982), we may also consider that common 
uncertainty about the value of a good creates affiliation between private values, especially in case 
of unfamiliar goods. However, it is not clear how affiliation could explain the gaps. Besides, the 
increasing  variances  of  WTP  and  WTA in  time  contradict  this  interpretation.  If  values  were 
affiliated and information across rounds was gathered, these variances should decrease. 
As a result, we focus on the features of auction mechanisms, particularly those of BDM. 
As compared to SPA and NPA, two major elements are specific to BDM: (1) individual bids do 
not affect market-clearing prices, which are determined by an external random process; (2) the 
bidder’s outcome is not affected by others’ bids. The mechanism works as if each bidder were 
bidding against an apparatus  which randomly  draws  a  market  price. The first  element  could 
explain why, even during the early rounds, the difference between  WTP   and  WTA   is lower 
with BDM. Indeed, in this quasi-market mechanism, it appears useless to submit a higher (lower) 
bid (offer) than the true one. The clearing price being exogenous, subjects can understand that 
their personal acceptability of prices is what matters most. In some sense, it is easier for a subject 
to learn how BDM works and to assimilate that submitting her true value is best. With SPA or 
NPA, it is less straightforward to understand that the price she pays does not depend on her bid; 
understanding these auction mechanisms is less obvious. Moreover, real-life buyers are used to 
thinking that lowering the value of a good is profitable
12. The second element may explain why 
                                                 
12 Besides online auctioneers, subjects are more often buyers than sellers in real life. We know that the gap is due to a 
low WTP the valuation of which is certainly more affected by life habits than the WTA valuation.   15 
the convergence process is slower with the BDM mechanism. The outcome being independent 
from other bidders’ or offerers’ strategies, subjects have less incentive to pay attention to what 
others bid or offer and to react to their moves. This induces a delay in the convergence of indices. 
Finally, SPA and NPA are very similar. This similarity could explain the resemblance 
between behaviors observed in both mechanisms. Yet, in SPA, after the practice rounds, the 
bidder or offerer can observe whether she is an off-margin bidder or offerer and thus unlikely to 
win the auction. If that is the case, she has no incentive to fully revise her bids or offers. Given 
the randomness of the number of winning trades in NPA, this argument does not hold, and this 
surely induces a more rapid convergence of indices. With regard to this difference between SPA 
and NPA, we should have expected even larger differences in experimental data. Unexpectedly, a 
high number of subjects did revise their valuations in SPA, even when they were extremely 
unlikely to be the part of the winning trades. 
 
5. Public and private motivations in the public good funding 
 
Some points regarding the specificity of the pure public good also need to be clarified. Let 
us first focus on this aspect relative to the auction mechanism. In SPA and NPA, the number of 
traded tons of carbon offset in a period is independent of the bids and offers submitted by the 
subjects. In any case, in SPA, one ton of carbon offset is bought and sold; in NPA,  1 n  tons of 
carbon offsets are traded. As a result, in these mechanisms, an extreme form of free-riding is 
likely to occur, since a subject’s bid cannot affect the total public good provision while it affects 
her payment: buying a certificate has a cost. On the contrary, in the BDM mechanism, subjects’ 
choices can affect the total provision of the public good. If a seller chooses a minimum selling 
price higher than the randomly selected price, she will keep her certificate and one more ton of 
carbon will be offset. The same reasoning applies for buyers. Put differently, subjects know they 
can influence the amount of carbon offset in BDM, because their probability of winning the right 
to buy one certificate is independent of other bidders: the higher the private bid, the higher the 
chances that a ton of carbon is offset. It is the only auction mechanism in which the level of the 
public good can be determined by the subjects. 
This difference between BDM on the one side and SPA and NPA on the other side allows 
identifying two distinct motivations in the public good funding. First, there is the (selfless) public   16 
good  motivation  to  fund  the  public  good,  which  translates  the  motivation  to  buy  or  keep  a 
certificate for the sake of all. Second, there is the (self-interested) private good motivation of the 
public good funding, which translates the motivation to buy or keep a certificate because the 
subject wants to own a certificate and be associated to the offsetting even though it does not 
modify the number of tons of carbon offset; through the private public good funding, she wants to 
derive a significant private utility from warm-glow, social status or guilt alleviation, etc. 
Despite  the  free-rider  incentive,  individuals  often  provide  more  public  goods  than 
traditional economic theory predicts. Public goods are then considered as impure public goods, 
which are products or services that combine both public and private benefits from the public 
good. Thus, from the funding perspective, our good becomes an impure public good. 
In BDM, both motivations for funding the public good are present, whereas in SPA and 
NPA, only the private good motivation exists, since subjects cannot affect the total provision of 
the public good. Now, let us consider  g , the mean value of all bids (WTP) and offers (WTA). 
After its computation over the ten rounds, we observe that  g  is strictly higher with BDM (8.57) 
than with SPA (7.26) or NPA (7.63). If we take the BDM value of  g  as a benchmark value of the 
public good, we can reasonably consider its surplus against SPA and NPA to reveal the value of 
the public good motivation. The surplus lies in the interval [0.94, 1.31]. The interval indicates 
that  the  private  good motivation highly  exceeds the  public  good motivation, i.e. subjects are 
mainly paying for enjoying warm-glow, being identified as contributors of the carbon offsetting 
or  to  alleviate  their  feelings  of  guilt.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  microeconomic 
analysis, where the private benefit governs the decisions of rational economic agents. 
Contrary to the observations where repeat-play public goods games produce declining 
contributions over time (Andreoni 1988),  g  increases in our experiments. As a matter of fact, if 
we regress  g  over the number of periods, we obtain a small but strictly positive correlation 
coefficient (BDM: 0.18; SPA: 0.13; NPA: 0.15). In standard public goods games, the diminution 
is motivated by free-riding and discouragement of high-type players to pursue the provision of 
the  public  good  alone.  We  propose  two  explanations  for  the increase  we  observe.  First,  the 
funded public good does not only concern the subjects that take part in the experiment but also 
the population "outside". Therefore, the free-riding attitude of some subjects cannot completely 
alter other subjects’ motivations since they do not specifically contribute for these free-riders, 
whereas they do in regular public goods games. Second, as already mentioned, the private good   17 
motivation outperforms the public good motivation, which also explains the absence of the usual 
decline  in  subjects’  bids
13.  Nevertheless,  these  findings  do  not  challenge  the  difference  in 
experimentation on mugs and certificates. Even if our experiments gave novel prominence to the 
private  good  motivation  in  the  public  good  funding,  subjects  always  traded  goods  with  the 
attribute of a pure public good. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
We examined three market mechanisms that could rectify the initial gap between WTP 




  disparities, 
we observe different results from Shogren  et  al.  (2001).  We  can  either  conclude  that  their 
findings – which suggest the validity of SPA and NPA in valuing private goods – are local, or 
that the public goods are subject to a different bidding behavior. 
We think that in quasi-market settings such as the BDM mechanism, subjects understood 
that they could decide on the aggregate level of the public good and behaved accordingly. In 
active markets with endogenous market-clearing prices such as NPA, no subject could influence 
the level of the public good. This acted as a disincentive to bid higher for the public good. In 
standard public goods games, it would have augmented its provision. Despite the fact that only 




  disparity 
dropped  with  repetition  in  all  three  mechanisms,  signifying  that  the  economic  theory  of 
rationality within maturing markets operates. These results match with those of Brookshire and 
Coursey (1987) who conclude that the market -like elicitation makes values for the public good 
more consistent with traditional economic notions. And yet, the theory implies a perfect equality 






  . 
                                                 
13 One could argue that bids increased because of the house money effect. However, Clark (2002) finds no evidence 
of it in a public good experiment. 
14 A natural explanation could lie in the lack of direct substitutes to the carbon offset market, that is, the substitution 
effect.   18 
We suggest that more experimental research on private and public values of a public good 
be conducted. For example, we could more accurately identify the private good and public good 
motivations by explicitly insisting on the fact that bids cannot affect the size of the public goods 
in SPA and NPA. As well, we could conduct experiments where subjects would be purposely 
deprived from any proof of having financed the public good and where each subject could only 
observe her final outcome; that way, we could distinguish between the desire to  finance the 
public good and the desire to be identified by others as a generous contributor to the public good. 
  In terms of public policy, we can ascertain that the main advantage of auction mechanisms 
when valuing a public good is that they reveal the economic value of public good and whether 
subjects derive any public good motivation from the funding. If they do, they submit superior 
bids and offers with BDM than with NPA. If not, which then suggests equal bids and offers 
between BDM and NPA, the public good does not have a clear public good motivation. In the 
first case, market settings make it possible for the public authority willing to financially support 
the public good production to estimate the optimal level of taxation from the market value. In the 
latter  case,  the  public  authority  is  made  aware  of  the  undervaluation  of  the  public  good’s 
usefulness  and  the  overvaluation  of  the  private  utility  derived  by  the  subjects.  It  should 
subsequently accredit individuals to fund the public good themselves. We actually observe such 
policy for various public goods associated with a high level of social prestige or recognition, that 
is, public goods whose funding contains a high private good component. At a higher level, the 
lack of public recognition of the firms’ private efforts could explain why voluntary environmental 
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Appendix 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (translated from French) 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. You are not allowed to 
speak to your neighbors during the experiment. 
 
All human activities release greenhouse gases, including CO2, that provoke the global warming. 
This warming endangers the planet, its inhabitants, its ecosystems and biodiversity. One way to 
fight against global warming is to plant trees. The key elements are the following: the forested 
surfaces are a carbon trap;  young forests store much more carbon than old forests, for trees 
absorb CO2 as they grow; forests preserve plant and animal biodiversity.  
 
An NGO has launched a project of carbon offsetting by funding the reforestation projects. The 
purpose is to offset carbon emissions by buying off your own emissions. The compensation is 
acknowledged by a certificate of one ton of carbon offset. 
 
During your education at the École Polytechnique ParisTech, you have received and printed, and 
will certainly do it over in the future, number of documents required for your schoolwork; it is 
also  the  case  with  your  consumption  of  energy  (such  as  light,  heating,  power  supply  for 
computers, etc.) Because you are contributing to the emissions through your consumption of 
paper and energy via your indirect demand for their manufacturing and distribution, we want to 
value your willingness to buy off your CO2 emissions.  
 
To this end, we will use a mechanism of purchasing and selling certificates of one ton of CO2 
offset, such as the ones we currently hold in our hands. 
 
In couple of weeks, we will get in touch with you by email to inform you about the number of 
offset tons of CO2 according to your decisions. 
 
We will now conduct an experiment. As you came into the class, some of you were designated as 
sellers while others were designated as buyers. Indeed, each of you randomly drew a number 
which decided between buyer and seller. Please keep this number until the end of the experiment: 
it will serve us to track you on the information cards. In the end of the experiment, during the 
imbursement, please give us back your numbers.   
 
Only one trial will be binding. We will repeat the experiment ten times. After the tenth trial, the 
youngest  person  in  the  room  will  randomly  draw  a  number  between  1  and  10,  which  will 
designate the binding trial. 
 
Please feel free to interrupt us and ask any question you might have in mind. 
 
Without further delay, we are going to read you the instructions concerning the conduct of the 
experiment. Let us start with those of you who are buyers. 





You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a certificate of one ton 
of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The bid you submit can range between 
EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf 
(acknowledged by your name on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please fill in the following table and mark an "x" for each price at which 
you are (and are not) willing to buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your maximum bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in ascending order. We 
randomly select one price from the price list, which becomes the displayed price. You buy a 
certificate if your bid is higher than or equal to the displayed price. 
 
Example: We randomly draw EUR 6. Since your bid is higher than or equal to EUR 6, you buy 
the certificate and pay EUR 6. 
 
   I will buy  I will not buy 
If the price is EUR 0  x   
If the price is EUR 0.5  x   
If the price is EUR 1.0  x   
…  …   
If the price is EUR 8.5  x   
If the price is EUR 9  x   
If the price is EUR 9.5    x 
…    … 
If the price is EUR 14.0    x 
If the price is EUR 14.5     x 
If the price is EUR 15.0     x 
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. Since you 
ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to 





You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an auction in order to 
sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. The offer you submit can range 
between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell the certificate with your name on, no ton of 
CO2 will be offset. 
 
To submit an offer, please fill in the following table and mark an "x" for each price at 
which you are (and are not) willing to sell the certificate.   23 
 
Rules: your minimum offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in descending order. We 
randomly select one price from the price list, which becomes the displayed price. You sell a 
certificate if your offer is lower than or equal to the displayed price.  
 
Example: We randomly draw EUR 10. Since your offer is lower than or equal to EUR 10, you 
sell the certificate and earn EUR 10. 
 
   I will sell  I will not sell 
If the price is EUR 15.0  x    
If the price is EUR 14.5  x    
If the price is EUR 14.0  x   
…  …   
If the price is EUR 5.0   x    
If the price is EUR 4.5  x   
If the price is EUR 4.0      x 
…      … 
If the price is EUR 1.0      x 
If the price is EUR 0.5      x 
If the price is EUR 0.0     x 
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. Since you 
ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to 
sell the certificate if the displayed price is higher than your value, and prevents you from selling 
otherwise. 
 




You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a certificate of one ton 
of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The bid you submit can range between 
EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf 
(acknowledged by your name on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please specify on the information card the price at which you are willing to 
buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in ascending order. We randomly 
select a number between 2 and n (n being the total number of bids). In other words, we randomly 
draw one of the bids and look at its rank. If your bid is contained in n–1 highest bids, you buy a 
certificate at the displayed price: the nth price. 
 
Example: twenty bids are submitted. We randomly draw seven, that is, the seventh-highest bid in 
the increasing order. You buy a certificate at a displayed price (seventh-highest bid) if your bid is 
contained in the six highest bids.   24 
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. If your bid is 
randomly drawn, your bid becomes the displayed price imposed to the n–1 highest bidders. Since 
you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables 





You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an auction in order to 
sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. The offer you submit can range 
between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell the certificate with your name on, no ton of 
CO2 will be offset. 
 
To  submit  an  offer,  please  specify  on  the  information  card  the  price  at  which  you  are 
willing to sell the certificate. 
 
Rules: your offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in descending order. We randomly 
select  a  number  between  2  and  n  (n  being  the  total  number  of  offers).  In  other  words,  we 
randomly draw one of the offers and look at its rank. If your offer is contained in n–1 lowest 
offers, you sell a certificate at the displayed price: the nth price. 
 
Example: twenty offers are submitted. We randomly draw six, that is, the sixth-lowest offer in the 
decreasing order. You sell your certificate at a displayed price (sixth-lowest offer) if your offer is 
contained in the five lowest offers. 
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. If your offer is 
randomly drawn, your offer becomes the displayed price imposed to the n–1 lowest offers. Since 
you ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables 







You own EUR 15. You can now participate in an auction in order to buy a certificate of one ton 
of CO2 offset. If that is your wish, please submit a bid. The bid you submit can range between 
EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to buy the certificate, trees which are planted on your behalf 
(acknowledged by your name on the certificate) will compensate one ton of CO2. 
 
To submit a bid, please specify on the information card the price at which you are willing to 
buy the certificate. 
 
Rules: your bid is ranked among all bids. Bids are classified in ascending order. If your bid is the 
highest, you buy a certificate at a displayed price: the second-highest bid. 
   25 
Example: ten bids are submitted. The highest bid is EUR 13. The second highest bid is EUR 11. 
The bidder who proposed EUR 13 buys the certificate and pays EUR 11.  
 
Nota bene: the higher your bid, the higher your chances of buying the certificate. Since you 
ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to 





You own a certificate of one ton of CO2 offset. You can now participate in an auction in order to 
sell your certificate. If that is your wish, please submit an offer. The offer you submit can range 
between EUR 0 and EUR 15. If you decide to sell the certificate with your name on, no ton of 
CO2 will be offset. 
 
To  submit  an  offer,  please  specify  on  the  information  card  the  price  at  which  you  are 
willing to sell the certificate. 
 
Rules: your offer is ranked among all offers. Offers are ranked in descending order. If your offer 
is the lowest, you sell a certificate at a displayed price: the second-lowest offer. 
 
Example: ten offers are submitted. The lowest offer is EUR 5. The second lowest offer is EUR 7. 
The seller who proposes EUR 5 sells her certificate and earns EUR 7.  
 
Nota bene: the lower your offer, the higher your chances of selling the certificate. Since you 
ignore the displayed price ex ante, giving your own value of one ton of CO2 offset enables you to 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the BDM, SPA and NPA mechanisms 
 
H0: Mean WTP – Mean WTA = 0; H1: Mean WTP – Mean WTA < 0 
a t-test: reject H0 at the 5% level 
Auction  Value measure    Trial 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
                         
BDM  WTP  Mean           6.18              7.11              7.82              8.11              8.29              8.66              8.39              8.71              8.82               8.61    
  N=19  Median           5.00              5.50              6.50              6.50              7.00              7.00              7.00              7.50              7.50               7.50    
    Variance        12.51           15.52           15.39           15.43           15.09           15.86           15.27           14.62           14.37             17.74    
  WTA  Mean        10.53              9.47              9.56              8.42              8.92              8.69              9.53              9.19              8.67               8.06    
  N=18  Median        10.00           10.00           10.00              8.75              9.50              9.75           10.00           10.00              9.75               8.25    
    Variance           6.07           12.34           18.03           18.60           20.95           21.53           19.75           16.86           17.79             20.97    
  Ratio of mean WTA/WTP             1.70              1.33              1.22              1.04              1.08              1.00              1.13              1.06              0.98               0.94    
  t-test of means
a       –3.85          –1.46          –0.83          0.27          0.06          0.46          –0.39          0.09          0.58          0.91    
                         
SPA  WTP  Mean           3.47              3.91              4.69              5.43              5.68              5.71              6.01              6.50              5.46               6.59    
  N=17  Median           3.00              4.10              5.00              5.60              5.80              6.05              7.00              7.00              7.00               7.00    
    Variance           9.64              6.68              5.52              5.42              6.15              7.71              8.86           14.50           12.56             10.04    
  WTA  Mean        10.66              8.74              8.47              9.07              8.59              9.82              9.40              8.32              9.52               9.23    
  N=17  Median        10.00              9.00              8.00              9.00              7.00           10.00              8.00              8.00              8.00               8.00    
    Variance        16.60           19.56           14.03           22.27           20.72           29.45           29.44           32.86           26.44             30.86    
  Ratio of mean WTA/WTP             3.07              2.23              1.81              1.67              1.51              1.72              1.57              1.28              1.75               1.40    
  t-test of means
a        –5.28          –3.41          –3.06          –2.35          –1.78          –2.30          –1.78          –0.59          –2.21          –1.20    
                         
NPA  WTP  Mean           3.97              3.98              4.77              4.93              4.77              5.19              6.18              6.12              6.85               6.72    
  N=15  Median           2.50              4.00              5.00              5.12              5.14              5.01              7.00              6.50              7.00               7.26    
    Variance        12.67              6.92              4.83              4.30              5.40              6.33              5.81              6.54              7.77             10.03    
  WTA  Mean        10.75           10.52           10.29           10.22              9.86              9.05              9.17              9.14              9.23               9.37    
  N=16  Median        10.50           10.00              9.74              9.65              8.77              8.50              8.49              8.35              8.09               8.50    
    Variance        10.19              6.99              6.32              9.46           10.31           13.75           16.67           13.30           14.08             20.64    
  Ratio of mean WTA/WTP             2.71              2.64              2.16              2.07              2.07              1.74              1.48              1.49              1.35               1.39    
  t-test of means
a        –5.06          –6.45          –6.21          –5.17          –4.60          –2.87          –1.90          –2.10          –1.40          –1.33   27 
Table 2. Exponential regression statistics 
Auction  Regression statistics  Our experiments  Mug experiments  
by Shogren et al. 
BDM  Speed of convergence (a)  –0.04  –0.00 
  y-intercept of regression (b)  1.5  1.5 
  R-square  0.69  0.00 
SPA  Speed of convergence (a)  –0.06  –0.09 
  y-intercept of regression (b)  2.5  1.9 
  R-square  0.61  0.63 
NPA  Speed of convergence (a)  –0.08  –0.12 
  y-intercept of regression (b)  2.9  2.8 
  R-square  0.95  0.96 
 
     28 
Table 3. Sequence convergence 
Auction  Convergence 
parameters  Our experiments  Mug experiments  
by Shogren et al. 
BDM  Convergence rate (μ)  0.69  0.99 
  Acceleration rate (q)  0.99  0.99 
SPA  Convergence rate (μ)  0.87  1.49 
  Acceleration rate (q)  1.05  1.31 
NPA  Convergence rate (μ)  0.83  0.95 
  Acceleration rate (q)  1.10  1.28 
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  disparity 
from mug experiments by Shogren et al. (2001)  
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